Abstract Much of the analysis of international norms has focused on norm diffusion at the systemic level. This study argues that such analyses based on neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism have two major shortcomings. One is that they pay much attention to successful cases of norm diffusion but neglect failed ones. The other is that they fail to examine the linkage between international norms and domestic structures in the processes of norm diffusion. By neglecting this linkage, systemic-level studies cannot clarify specific mechanisms and process through which international norms reach the domestic arena. This study stresses that domestic structures, in particular cultural and political structures, are the key factors allowing international norm diffusion at the domestic level. Analyzing Japan's refusal to accept an anti-whaling norm, this paper argues that these domestic structures have served as filters to block the emergence and acceptance of the norm in Japan.
International relations scholars have diverse views of the diffusion of international norms at the systemic level. Regime theorists contend that states as rational actors comply with international norms based on cost-benefit calculations of material benefits (Krasner 1993; Keohane 1984) . In contrast, constructivists emphasize the role of transnational activist networks in norm diffusion (Keck and Sikkink 1998) and the role of socialization and peer pressure at the systemic level (Florini 1996; Sikkink 1993; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) .
However, neither regime theorists nor constructivists can adequately explain why Japan defies the anti-whaling norm. On the one hand, the perspectives of regime theory cannot account for Japan's stance, which is based neither on a response to hegemonic threats nor a rational calculation of material benefits. On the other hand, the constructivists' concept of transnational activist networks is not applicable to the Japanese whaling case, as such networks have exerted little influence over Japan's policy.
In addition, the constructivist notion of norm evolution and norm compliance through socialization is not applicable, since Japan has failed to comply with strong international pressure on behalf of the anti-whaling norm.
In general, these systemic-level analyses can parsimoniously explain overall trends of norm diffusion at the international level. However, they focus only on successful cases of norm diffusion and fail to explain unsuccessful ones. They also have difficulty accounting for specific cases of norm diffusion at the domestic level and are unable to explain the specific mechanisms by which international norms reach the domestic front. These shortcomings derive from the fact that systemic-level research pays little or no attention to the linkage between international norms and domestic structures.
The explanation of Japan's non-compliance lies in its domestic politics. In particular, one should not ignore the domestic political and cultural structures, both of which are critical in determining Japan's non-compliance decision (see general discussion of these structures in Checkel 1999) . These structures have prevented "norm entrepreneurs" (Nadelmann 1990; Finnemore 1996; Florini 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 896-901 ) from gaining access to the decision-making process and from persuading policy leaders and the general public the legitimacy of the anti-whaling norm.
To analyze this case, this paper first presents a brief overview of the literature on international norm diffusion, with a focus on regime theory (i.e., neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism) and constructivism. Next, the paper analyzes how domestic, cultural and political structures affect international norm diffusion at the domestic level.
The paper then goes on to discuss the anti-whaling norm in particular. It analyzes the evolution of the norm, Japan's non-compliance, and the effect of Japanese cultural and political structures on diffusion of the norm. The paper ends with a concluding analysis of the failed norm adoption in Japan and its theoretical implications.
International Norm Diffusion
What is a norm? I deploy Krasner's definition of norms, which is commonly accepted by international relations scholars. Norms are "standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations" (Krasner 1983: 2) . Norms have varying strengths. As Legro (1997) notes, different norms generate different degrees of agreement. Some norms are international, whereas others are regional, domestic, or local. In related issue areas, there may be competing norms. If a norm has not been fully internalized by actors and still generates disputes regarding its validity (see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) , the norm may face another competing norm that embraces a different set of rights and obligations. Norm salience at the international level depends in large part on which states promote a norm in question. Some states are crucial to the process of norm dispersion, as they can effectively exercise diplomatic power to persuade other states to accept the norm.
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Regime theorists view norms from a utilitarian perspective that posits actors as following the logic of consequences (March and Olson 1989) . From this perspective, state actors are utility maximizers, pursuing their desired goals based on rational, costbenefit calculations, and actors comply with norms that match their interests and objectives. In other words, regime theorists contend that norms have an instrumental role in affecting state behavior and that norm compliance reflects the self-interested and rational behavior of states.
Regime theory is largely divided into two camps: neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. Neorealists are especially interested in the role of a hegemon in enforcing norms. From their perspective, international norms emerge and spread when they are promoted by a hegemon. Norm compliance occurs because of hegemonic coercion: the hegemon coerces an international norm upon other states by means of 1 In the case at hand, both anti-and pro-whaling norms have some degree of international support and thus compete with each other. Whaling is a highly controversial issue and neither of the norms has full support from all the states around the globe. At the same time, the institutionalization of strict anti-whaling regulations within the IWC helps to project the anti-whaling norm internationally. The anti-whaling norm is also strengthened by the political and economic influence of its main supporters, which include United States and most other developed countries. economic or military sanctions. Thus, so the argument goes, norm compliance is associated with the national survival for weak states. Neorealists assume that norms reflect the distribution of material capabilities in the international system. Thus in their view, norms change with the rise and fall of hegemons (Gilpin 1981; Krasner 1993) .
The neorealist analysis of norms does not travel well to the Japanese whaling case. Although the international anti-whaling regime (specifically the International Whaling Commission, IWC) is led by the United States, Washington as a hegemon has not been able to force Japan to abandon whaling, especially its "scientific" whaling program that began in 1987 (see below). Even though the anti-whaling norm was strengthened in the 1970s and 1980s due in large measure to increased US pressure, Japan's basic position on whaling has not changed. While Japan accepted the IWC's moratorium on commercial whaling in the 1980s due to the threat of US sanctions, Tokyo began the scientific whaling program immediately after it adopted the moratorium despite US opposition, thus challenging the authority of the hegemon. In addition, the neorealist notion of materialism does not account fully for Japan's non-compliance. Even though Tokyo accepted the moratorium out of material concerns (based on the fear of economic sanctions), its switch to scientific whaling reopened the door to other sanctions.
According to neoliberal institutionalism, norm compliance occurs even in the absence of hegemonic coercion. From this viewpoint, norm compliance is voluntary.
While neoliberals share the neorealist view of states as rational actors pursuing material interests in an anarchic world, they assert that rationalism and anarchy do not exclude cooperation and that states comply with international norms because of long-term material incentives ("the shadow of the future"). To neoliberals, norms reduce uncertainties, minimize transactions costs, and facilitate cooperation among selfinterested states. Neoliberals argue that states may comply with norms even though doing so would make them forgo short-term material interests; states are concerned more with long-term material interests or absolute gains than with short-term relative gains (Keohane 1984) .
When applied to the Japanese whaling case, neoliberals would have us believe that Tokyo complies with the anti-whaling norm because, as a rational actor, it finds long-term material benefits from such cooperation. But this is not true in the Japanese case. Tokyo instead continues to embrace whaling against Japan's own rational interests.
Many anti-whaling states are important political and economic allies of Japan. The United States in particular is Japan's single most important ally, protecting Tokyo's security and providing a vast market for Japanese goods. Whaling could hurt US-Japan relations, and Tokyo's persistent embrace of whaling has subjected Japan to repeated US threats of economic sanctions (Pearlstein 2000; Struck 2000) . However, the Japanese government still refuses to stop whaling. From a utilitarian point of view, the Japanese policy is characterized by a myopic short-term perspective that threatens Tokyo's longterm economic and political interests.
According to some constructivists such as Keck and Sikkink (1998) , transnational advocacy networks-consisting of groups and individuals united by common principles, values, and beliefs who exchange information and resources in a nonhierarchical, voluntary, and reciprocal manner-are key actors in the process of norm creation, diffusion, and enforcement. In their view, these networks lobby, mobilize information, and use material leverage to pressure states to conform to international norms. However, the role of transnational advocacy networks is extremely limited in the Japanese whaling case. Even though activist groups such as Greenpeace have protested vigorously against Japan's whaling practices (e.g., by mobilizing public opinion, holding rallies, and even trying to physically block Japanese whaling vessels), their direct, often provocative campaigns have not been successful in reversing state policy. Rather, these protests have angered state officials and hardened their pro-whaling stance, while at the same time alienating the public (Komatsu 2000; Morishita 2002 ).
Constructivists have also examined the evolution of international norms at the systemic level. Finnermore and Sikkink (1998) have introduced the concept of norm cascade, meaning that when support for a particular norm reaches a threshold or tipping point, norm diffusion will be fast, as social interaction around the norm brings more and more states into line, producing a cascading effect. However, this cascade analysis is not useful for explaining the Japanese pro-whaling behavior. Even though the anti-whaling norm long ago reached the tipping point internationally (Friedheim 2001 ; see discussion below), norm diffusion has not occurred in Japan. Tokyo not only refuses to accept the principles prescribed in the norm but also maintains its abrasive pro-whaling rhetoric that shows little sign of concession or conformity. Thus, the constructivist argument that social interaction influences compliance decisions does not hold in the Japanese case.
Bringing in Domestic Politics
These system-level analyses are useful for illuminating the broad phenomena of norm diffusion at the international level, but they are ill equipped to explain how international norms reach the domestic level. International norms need to be linked to domestic structures, and without domestic institutions in favor of the emergence and acceptance of ideational alternatives, new norms are unlikely to emerge and spread domestically. In other words, domestic structures serve as filters for international norm.
Here I emphasize two domestic structures critical for international norm adoption: domestic cultural and political structures.
Domestic Cultural Structure
International norm diffusion is influenced by the degree of cultural match between international norms and the cultural characteristics of the domestic population. I use Checkel's (1999:87) definition of cultural match: a situation where the prescriptions embodied in an international norm are convergent with domestic norms, as reflected in discourse, the legal system (constitutions, judicial codes, law), and bureaucratic agencies (organizational ethos and administrative procedures).
For international norms to be empowered domestically, the prescriptions embedded in the norms must be compatible with the views embedded in the political culture of a target state. recognizing the obligations associated with the norm. Conversely, the salience of foreign norms in the domestic polity can be hindered by the lack of a cultural match (Checkel 2 Political culture consists of ideas, attitudes, and beliefs held commonly by a people, which form the basis for their political behavior. According to Risse-Kappen (1994: 209) , political culture refers to "those worldviews and principled ideas-values and norms-that are stable over long periods of time and are taken for granted by the vast majority of the population." 1999). If the international norm conflicts with the domestic political culture, domestic actors may resist international pressure to adopt the norm. They may find the acceptance of the international norm as compromising state sovereignty (Cortell and Davis 2000) .
An international norm's domestic salience largely derives from the legitimacy accorded it in the domestic cultural context. Thus, a norm's domestic strength may not always correspond to the norm's international standing (Goertz and Diehl 1992: 646) . A norm that is internationally well accepted lacks domestic salience if it is denied legitimacy domestically due to, for example, a cultural mismatch. Such a denial might be expressed by the state repeatedly failing to comply with the norm's obligations or refusing to ratify agreements associated with the norm.
Cultural match is, of course, issue specific (Checkel 1999) . Thus within the same state, there may be a match with one international norm but not with another. For example, there is a poor match between the international norm against whaling and the domestic culture (see below) but a strong match between other international norms and Japanese culture (e.g., the anti-nuclear proliferation norm).
According to Checkel (1999) , cultural match is not a dichotomous variable but rather scales along a continuum. At one end is a positive match, indicating complete congruence between an international norm and domestic culture in a particular issue area.
At the other end is a negative match, which marks no congruence between international norm and domestic culture. In the middle is a null match, where the domestic arena contains no obvious normative barriers to a particular international norm (Checkel 1999: 87) .
Cultural match is difficult to measure (Cortell and Davis 2000) . But one can say that the match is low when only a small percentage of the population endorses an international norm and the state refuses to legitimize it. High levels occur when not only the state but also groups representing a broad range of society endorse the norm (Hawkins 2001 ).
Cultural match is not limited to traditions and customs. It also extends to individuals' belief systems, ideologies, and perceptions shaped by socio-cultural environments. For example, in their study on a missionary campaign against female genital mutilation (FGM) in Kenya in the 1920s, Keck and Sikkink (1998) showed how the diffusion of an anti-FGM norm depended on the perceptions of domestic actors.
Villagers saw the campaign as a symbol of colonialism, that is, an attempt to impose
Western values upon the local, and reacted to the campaign negatively, appealing to local traditions as a way of strengthening domestic unity.
Domestic Political Structure
International norm diffusion is also affected by the domestic political structure. Cortell and Davis (1996) have introduced four types of domestic structures to explain cross-issue variation of norm diffusion (see Table 1 ). affecting policy, such as public opinion and pressure from citizens groups, are blocked.
The Type I structure is a statist model, representing an elitist, top-down decision-making structure.
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In this centralized political structure, the adoption of norms is difficult as decision making solely depends on the state elite. However, once norms are adopted through elite learning via persuasion-i.e., by being convinced through argument and principled 4 In a Type II structure, state-societal relations are close. This means societal actors have access to the decision-making process. However, the decision-making authority is still centralized and thus societal actors need to work closely with the state to bring about change. In the Type III structure, state primacy is expected because state-societal relations are distant and there is no institutional mechanism that links societal actors to the decision-making process. However, the Type III differs from the Type I structure in that decision-making authority is decentralized across various state institutions. Thus actions and interests of these state institutions are not unitary. In a Type IV structure, state-societal relations are close and the state decision-making authority is disbursed. Thus societal actors can work with diverse state agencies to wield influence (Cortell and Davis 1996) .
debate (Checkel 2001: 562) -the implementation of policies based on the norms is likely to take place (see Checkel 1997) . In contrast, in a more pluralistic, less-centralized structure where societal actors have many access points through which to influence policy (Type IV), international norms may enter more easily but are less likely to be implemented due to a fragmented decision-making structure (see Sikkink 1991; Checkel 1997) . In a Type I structure, transnational actors have difficulty penetrating into the domestic decision-making process. Risse-Kappen (1994 argues that transnational norm entrepreneurs must have an alliance with domestic groups supporting their cause to have an impact. In his view, they must build winning coalitions to influence domestic policy and these domestic groups need to provide necessary channels into the political systems (Risse-Kappen, 1994). However, the Type I structure does not allow this kind of coalition building between transnational actors and domestic ones.
In short, domestic cultural and political structures are important variables for influencing state compliance with international norms. Yet, they are usually neglected in research on international norm diffusion. The following section will address these domestic variables by examining how they have affected the diffusion of the anti-whaling nom in Japan.
Evolution of the Anti-whaling Norm
The emergence and diffusion of a norm against whaling is a relatively recent phenomenon. The norm has emerged and spread since the 1970s, particularly through institutionalization via the International Whaling Commission (IWC). , including many actually anti-whaling states (e.g., New Zealand, the Netherlands). By 1983, 28 of the 39 member states were non-whaling states (Day 1987: 97; Peterson 1992: 176-178 Wide Fund for Nature, began international "save-the-whales" campaign, calling for whale sanctuaries and a moratorium on commercial whaling (Mandel 1980 delegations, and even participating in some delegations at IWC meetings (Stedman 1990; Spencer 1991; Friedheim 2001) . As non-voting observers, the anti-whaling NGOs' goal was to influence voting members to bring about a total ban on whaling. These NGOs argued that the number of whales had declined sharply and that whale stocks needed to recover. The number of NGO participants at the IWC greatly increased in the 1970s and 1980s, and many of them began to work with their anti-whaling state delegates through interagency meetings prior to IWC sessions (Stedman 1990) . Also, these NGOs reportedly contributed to the expansion of the IWC membership by footing the membership fees and writing the required membership documents for small, poor nonwhaling states to become members of the IWC, so that anti-whaling states would grow to outnumber whaling states within the organization (Spencer 1991; Friedheim 2001 ).
Third, like-minded anti-whaling states such as the United States, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Germany, and France, established a successful coalition at the IWC. The coalition has been able to command more than half of the IWC votes by picking up many swing votes and has thus been able to control many IWC decisions.
These like-minded states closely worked with environmental NGOs to influence voting at the IWC (Stedman 1990; Friedheim 2001) . environmentalists and the US government (Stedman 1990; Wong 2001) . Although the IWC rejected the Stockholm resolution, reflecting the then pro-whaling sentiment at the IWC, this resolution marked an important first step for the whale preservation movements in many parts of the world.
The Stockholm initiative paved the way towards the eventual IWC adoption of several resolutions to restrict whaling. In 1974, the IWC adopted the New Management Procedures (NMP) as a substitute for a moratorium. The NMP divided whale stocks in three categories, set quotas for each one on the grounds of scientific assessments and sustainability, and held that the commercial whaling of depleted stocks be halted until their recovery. 8 Then, in 1976, whale species were allocated separate quotas so that depleted ones would be protected. In 1979, the IWC banned pelagic whaling except for with the abundant minke whales in the Antarctic Ocean. In the same year, the IWC established the Indian Ocean as a cetacean sanctuary (Stedman 1990 ).
In 1982, ten years after the Stockholm initiative, the IWC adopted a blanket moratorium on all commercial whaling to be implemented in [1985] [1986] . The moratorium was highly controversial. It was never endorsed by the IWC's Scientific
Committee, which did not see the need for a blanket moratorium on all species (Kalland 1998) . Some pro-whaling member states such as Japan and Norway lodged an objection to the IWC decision and attempted to continue commercial whaling under quotas determined by their own governments (Friedheim 2001 (Friedheim 2001: 4) . 9 IWC members can legally exempt themselves from applying the organizations' resolutions. They can file a formal objection under Article 5 and shed the obligation of enforcing a rule to which they object (Friedheim 2001) . 10 According to this law, a foreign country's fishing allocations in the US EEZ are to be removed if the Secretary of Commerce determines that country is engaged in whaling operations which diminish the effectiveness of the ICRW (Sumi 1989 ).
whaling. Since Japan's economic interests in the US EEZ were substantial and Japanese officials did not want to antagonize relations with the United States, Tokyo reluctantly signed the Murazawa-Baldridge pact in 1987 to drop its objection to the IWC moratorium in exchange for a quid pro quo of being allocated a fishing quota in the US EEZ (Sumi 1989; Wong 2001 ).
The 1982 moratorium was initially intended to be a temporary measure, as the IWC planned to halt commercial whaling from 1986 for five years and conduct a comprehensive assessment by 1990 as a basis to reconsider the moratorium. But it has become a de facto permanent ban on commercial whaling. Although the comprehensive assessment was done by the IWC Scientific Committee, finding that many whaling stocks had recovered, the broader IWC refused to implement the Scientific Commission's "Revised Management Scheme" (RMS) which would have eased the ban. 11 Furthermore, the moratorium was supplemented by a Southern Ocean sanctuary, adopted by the IWC in 1994, to target Japan, which had been trying to resume commercial whaling in the Southern Ocean area (Friedheim 2001) .
How did the anti-whaling states succeed in persuading other IWC members to support their cause? Much credit should be given to the way IWC delegates representing the anti-whaling states, together with Western NGOs, strategically framed the whaling issue. They developed two overlapping discourses on whaling. One, supported by environmental NGOs, concerns ecological protection and contends that whales are an 11 In 1991 IWC accepted the Revised Management Procedure (RMP) as a scientific formula for sustainable, regulated whaling. In 1992, the RMS was proposed to the IWC to include rules for conducting surveys of whale numbers and for the inspection and observation of commercial whaling; the RMP was to be included in the RMS. However, neither the RMP nor the RMS has been implemented and formally adopted into the IWC Schedule (Burns 1994; Friedheim 2001) .
endangered species needing protection. The other, supported by animal rights organizations, centers around ethics and morality, contending that whales are intelligent, friendly, and the largest mammals on earth and that it is barbaric to kill them. The antiwhaling advocates have often presented these two discourses altogether. According to Kalland and Moeran (1992: 8) , these advocates have created an image of a "super whale"
that is the largest animal on earth (applicable only to the blue whale), has the largest brain (the sperm whale), and is friendly (the gray whale) and endangered (the bowhead and the blue whale).
In recent years, the morality-based discourse has become more popular among anti-whaling advocates than the discourse emphasizing ecological protection. According to Kalland and Moeran (1992) , this shift has occurred because advocates have found it difficult to scientifically defend the position that all whales are endangered. In fact, some scientists, including even those on the IWC's Scientific Committee, claim that the whales placed in the highest IWC category as Protection Stocks have recovered and that at least one of these-the minke whale-is abundant (Aron 1988: 104; Gulland and Klinowska 1988: 44; De Alessi 1995; Friedheim 2001: 4) . 12 Yet, these types of science-based viewpoints are largely ignored by anti-whaling advocates (Peterson 1992; Aron 2001) who instead condemn whaling as an immoral and shameful practice (Friedheim 2001: 5 With the moratorium and sanctuaries in place, the anti-whaling norm has become institutionalized at the IWC and the pro-whaling states in the organization, who are led by Japan, have been under growing pressure to abandon their whaling practices.
Referring to Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998: 888) notion of norm "life cycle, " Friedheim (2001: 9) claims that a dominant anti-whaling norm has emerged at the international level:
The preservation norm has gone through a "tipping point" and has "cascaded" throughout the world community, and all that needs to be done is to have it "internalized' by the peoples and governments of the world. 14 Even though the number of pro-whaling IWC members has increased in recent years (due in particular to the addition of several Caribbean nations), they are still outnumbered by anti-whaling states. In addition, they cannot overturn existing whaling regulations such as the 1982 moratorium, since such changes require a two-thirds majority vote that Japan and other pro-whaling states cannot garner. Japan's inability to change international regulations to restart commercial whaling is also exemplified in another international organization concerned with whaling: the UN Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). Although many CITES member states are sympathetic to Japan, they have not successfully institutionalized the pro-whaling cause. For example, CITES has repeatedly rejected Japan's proposals to downlist a few species of whales (e.g., minke whales) from Appendix I (most endangered species) to Appendix II (potentially endangered species subject to monitored or managed trade) of the convention. If accepted, these proposals would have allowed resumption of commercial trade of these species. In 2002, Japan proposed to downlist minke whales and Bryde's whales to Appendix II, but it failed to muster even a majority of vote. (A two-thirds majority is required for such proposals to be approved.) The delegates voted 54-41 to reject Japan's minke whales proposal and 63-43 against the Bryde's whale proposal (Bell 2002 Japan has tried, but failed, to reverse the anti-whaling trend at the IWC. Tokyo unsuccessfully tried to lift the moratorium on commercial whaling. Japan also lobbied the IWC to give Japanese coastal communities that have traditionally depended on the small type coastal whaling (STCW) the same rights as aboriginal communities in North America. Japan has repeatedly appealed to the IWC for special relief quotas of 50 minke whales for these coastal communities. Japan sees it as contradictory that while the hunting of small type minke whales in Japanese waters (under the STCW scheme) is prohibited, the Alaskan Eskimos are allowed to harvest bowhead whales each year, even 15 An anonymous reviewer pointed out that Japan's decision to start scientific whaling was influenced by the US decision to eventually end all foreign fishing rights in the US EEZ by 1988. Japanese officials felt that once Japan lost its fishing rights in US territory, the country would have little ßelse to lose by whaling. Judging from these official statements, one can assume that Japan is not likely to change its position on whaling in the near future. Japan has insisted, and will likely continue to maintain, that whaling is a matter of resource management and that the practice should be allowed as long as whale populations are maintained at levels that ensure reproduction.
Japan's Domestic Cultural Structure
The Japanese public and leaders perceive the whaling controversy largely as a cultural matter. They believe that Japan has distinct gyoshoku-bunka, a whale-eating culture (Sumi 1989; Doi 1992; Kalland 1998; Komatsu 2000; Morishita 2002; Osumi 2003 to prehistoric times. Based on the discovery in ancient burial mounds of whaling drawings, whale bones, and hand harpoons, they claim that some Japanese communities first ate stranded whales and then began primitive whaling during the Jomon period (10,000-300 BC). These scholars and officials also argue that with the introduction of large nets in the end of the 17th century, Japanese commercial whaling began in Taiji (near Osaka) and spread to southern Japan in the 18th century and then to northern Japan in the following century. This supposedly led to a collective gyoshoku-bunka, with whalers sharing the whale meat with other villagers and with local communities developing their own unique whaling cuisines (Takahashi 1992 , Osumi 2003 .
According to this view, Japanese have used whales in a distinct manner. Unlike
Westerners (e.g., the Americans, British, and Dutch) who used whales principally to extract oil, the Japanese have used almost the entire whale body for food and oil, without "wasting" any body parts (Komatsu 2002: 31; Osumi 2003: 60-61) , so this argument goes.
What is often neglected in these observations, however, is that for thousands of years gyoshoku-bunka was limited to certain coastal regions in Japan and that the eating of whale only became commonplace nationally after World War II (due to the necessity to feed the impoverished population; see Kalland 1998) . In fact, even during the early 20 th century, some people in northern Japan resisted killing whales as they saw them as mystical gods ("Ebisu") who looked over communities and helped bring them wealth (Takahashi 1992) .
The legitimacy of gyoshoku-bunka in Japan rests not only on the Japanese belief system that eating whales is a tradition practiced for thousands years, but also on an idea that whales are a kind of fish and a source of protein. 16 Based on Buddhist teachings, the Japanese historically considered eating fish and whales acceptable, whereas eating land animals as undesirable. This belief is evidenced by several decrees provided by Japanese leaders. For example, Emperor Tenmu, an ardent Buddhist in the sixth century, banned the killing and eating of land animals, except for fish and whales. Similarly, in 17th century, Tsuneyosi Tokugawa, the fifth shogun of the Edo period, proclaimed a similar degree (Komatsu 2002; Osumi 2003) . Many Japanese observers thus argue that whale eating is an important part of Japanese history and culture, as opposed to the eating of beef which, as they correctly point out, began only in the last 200 years in Japan following Westernization of the country (Sumi 1989) .
Because of the perception that whales are fish, many Japanese do not share Western animal rights activists' view of whales' rights. According to one cross-national survey on public attitudes to whaling conducted by North American researchers, there is a wide perception gap between people in Japan and anti-whaling countries. For example, fully 64 percent of the Japanese respondents in the survey stated that there was nothing wrong with whaling if it was properly regulated, whereas only 21 percent of the Australian respondents agreed with the statement. Also, only 25 percent of the Japanese respondents stated that they could not imagine anyone would kill anything as intelligent as whales, whereas 64 percent of the Australian counterparts agreed with the statement (Freeman and Kellert 1992: 4) .
Some Japanese pro-whaling advocates see the whaling controversy as a struggle between "meat eaters" (especially the Anglo-Saxons) and "fish eaters" (the Japanese) and even link the controversy to racism and cultural imperialism, especially since the antiwhaling movement is led by the United States, which they see as an aggressor in international relations. They view the anti-whaling imposition as a cultural infringement that one group imposes on another group that is branded as morally inferior (Friedheim 2001) . At the 1989 IWC meeting, for example, Japan's commissioner argued that the meat-eating culture was taking advantage of the IWC to destroy the fish-eating culture (Stedman 1990: 157-158) . According to this view, it is hypocritical to claim that it is morally wrong to kill certain mammals such as whales but acceptable to kill others such as kangaroos (in Australia), fox (in Europe) and baby cattle (in the US). Any culture has the right to maintain a set of cultural practices, so this argument goes, as long as those practices do not lead to overharvesting and extinction (Komatsu 2000; Browne 2001; Corliss 2002b; Komatsu 2002 ).
In defense of Japan's gyoshoku-bunka, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Reaching out to this more open-minded young generation, some Japanese environmental NGOs have taken on the whaling issue. However, they have had little success in affecting policy on this issue. To understand why, it is necessary to consider not only issues of cultural mistmatch, but also Japan's domestic political structure vis-à-vis whaling.
Japan's Domestic Political Structure
The domestic decision-making process over whaling is highly centralized with strong bureaucratic leadership. Bureaucratic leaders are the main advocates of whaling in Japan and this creates obstacles to the diffusion of the anti-whaling norm. The process largely excludes influence over policy by anti-whaling actors, such as domestic and transnational NGOs. The process exemplifies Cortell and Davis's (1996) Type I structure characterized by centralized authority and distant relations between the state and society.
In Japan, whales are not subject to regulation by the Second, MAFF and the Fisheries Agency leaders think that Japan has the legal right to take whales for research and that it is obliged to process and use them after research under the ICRW. In fact, under Article 8 of the ICRW, member states are allowed to conduct whaling for purposes of scientific research without regulation by the IWC (Stedman 1990: 162) .
Third, since whaling is under the jurisdiction of MAFF and the Fisheries Agency, the end of whaling could mean a decline in MAFF/Fisheries Agency's budget and political power. Given intense interministerial rivalries in Japan, it is not likely that especially MAFF would voluntarily concede one of its major areas of jurisdiction.
Fourth, MAFF and Fisheries Agency leaders wants to keep the whaling industry alive in hope of resuming commercial whaling in the future. This could further strengthen the political power of the ministry and agency.
Fifth, MAFF and Fisheries officials fear that the ban on whaling will potentially have a spillover effect on the catching of other types of sea creatures under their domain.
Japan has faced increased international pressure to regulate its fisheries activities, especially those involving southern bluefish tuna. 17 In addition, MAFF and Fisheries officials claim that certain types of whales have rapidly increased in number in recent decades and that it is more sustainable to moderately hunt these whales than preserve them all. In their view, such a rapid increase represents a serious problem, since these whales eat so many fish that they could eventually destroy the ecological balance and threaten fishing industries (Morishita 2002 ).
Finally, as discussed above, MAFF and the Fisheries Agency's stance reflects the a broad societal view that Japan has had a long history of gyoshuku-bunka (whale eating culture) and that whales are a type of fish, and that there are no ethical differences between eating whale and eating beef or pork. Given these perceptions, MAFF and Nakasone also openly opposed Japan's scientific whaling program, but his opposition was overridden by MAFF and the Fisheries Agency (Wong 2001) . Thus, even prime ministers cannot pressure the bureaucratic agencies to conform to the anti-whaling norm.
The bureaucratic decision-making system also excludes societal pressure, even from the business sector. Contrary to the popular image that the Japanese private industry strongly influences state policy (Peterson 1992) , its involvement in shaping whaling policy is very minor. The Japanese whaling industry has downsized substantially since However, they have had no serious impact on policy making on whaling as they are new, their campaigns are as yet small, and they have not been taken seriously by the bureaucratic leaders. Apart from these NGOs, there are a few smaller domestic NGOs that embrace the anti-whaling cause, such as the Elsa Nature Conservancy, the Japan Wildlife Conservation Society, and the Kujira Mondai Network (Whale Problem Network). None of them, however, is influential in policy making (Wong 2001) .
Lacking access to the decision making structure and incapable of forming a "winning coalition" with influential policy makers, domestic NGOs have proved to be ineffectual in influencing Japanese whaling policy.
In other fields such as humanitarian aid, Japanese NGOs have had some success in collaborating with the bureaucracy, particularly with MOFA. NGO-MOFA cooperation has been made possible not only because of strong public support for NGOs involved in aid and development issues but also because of intense competition between ministries, rather than monopoly of one agency, in Japan's official development aid (ODA). With multiple ministries (e.g., the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economics and Industry) competing for budget and power in ODA, MOFA has welcomed cooperation with NGOs, since both the ministry and its NGO partners share an interest in increasing humanitarian assistance to the developing world. MOFA is eager to work with NGOs in humanitarian fields because NGOs enjoy strong public support for their activities, so, by cooperating with NGOs, MOFA can expand its domestic support base, which can help the ministry gain a larger share of the ODA budget. In turn, close relations with MOFA have allowed NGOs to influence Japan's ODA policy as a whole (e.g., shifting emphasis from infrastructure to humanitarian aid) (Hirata 2002 ).
In the field of whaling, however, this type of close relations does not exist between NGOs and the bureaucracy. There is no bureaucratic competition in the area.
There is no common interest between NGOs and the bureaucracy. Anti-whaling NGOs do not have a wide public support as development NGOs do, and the bureaucracy, especially MAFF, has no interest in working with them.
Transnational NGOs have proved to be ineffective in changing Japan's whaling policy, too. As mentioned above, they have failed to establish close working relations with local NGOs and have also failed to penetrate into the Japanese decision-making system. They work closely with American and European legislators in promoting the anti-whaling cause, but have not found sympathetic Japanese legislators who would represent their position.
As the decision-making mechanism is highly centralized with strong MAFF leadership, the ministry's preference and interests matter a great deal. In this top-down policy-making environment, what MAFF and the Fisheries Agency decide shapes Japan's policy. If the anti-whaling norm is to be empowered domestically, the ministry and agency have to embrace the new norm. Since they have no interest in changing their position, and since anti-whaling actors have failed to change MAFF and the Fisheries Agency's views or create a powerful enough social movement that would force the ministry's and agency's hand, the pro-whaling policy has continued.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that system-level analyses are inadequate to explain Japan's whaling practice. Regime theory is not applicable to the Japanese whaling case since both neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist explanations fail to account for Japan's policy, which is based on neither hegemonic pressure nor long-term material interests. Also, constructivists' explanations of norm diffusion is not useful either, because transnational activist networks have had little effect on Japan's whaling policy, and the social interaction of states (which includes peer pressure) has not led Japan to take a more conciliatory stance. In short, both regime theory and constructivism are useful for explaining general phenomena of norm diffusion at the systemic level but cannot specify exact mechanisms through which international norms reach or fail to reach the domestic level.
This paper asserts that domestic institutions matter in the process of norm compliance in two ways. First, the pre-existing cultural structure affects actors'
willingness to comply with a nom. Prior societal ideas (e.g., that whales are a type of fish and that there is not much difference between eating whale meat and eating beef or pork)
have hindered Japan's compliance with the anti-whaling norm. Domestic culture exerts a great pull on actor behavior. In an environment where there is little match between an international norm and domestic culture, policy leaders can take advantage of existing domestic ideas to arouse nationalism and create "us-versus-them" feelings. By doing so, they aggravate tensions between the domestic public and international norm advocates.
Second, the structure of political institutions also explains Japan's noncompliance policy. The decision-making process over whaling is highly centralized under the leadership of the bureaucracy, particularly that of MAFF and the Fisheries Agency. The bureaucracy is insulated from societal actors who in turn lack access points through which to affect policy change. Anti-whaling NGOs do not have any influence in policy making. Since MAFF and the Fisheries Agency have a virtual monopoly over Japan's whaling policy, their organizational culture and politics (reflecting both the broad societal idea that whales are not different from fish and the organizational self-interest in preserving its ministerial jurisdiction) determine Japan's national policy.
In summary, I advocate a research design that pays closer attention to the linkage between international norms and domestic structures so that we will better understand in detail how and why norms diffuse, or fail to diffuse, domestically. Future research is needed to address specifically how domestic cultural and political structures influence nom diffusion. In particular, it is important to understand how to measure the degree of cultural normative fit and how to determine the type of domestic political structure through which given international norms travel.
